Education reform in Brazil: An enduring coalition?
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The idea of creating a common framework for education in Brazil had long been a contentious one. For decades, influential groups, such as prominent academics in Brazil’s Schools of Education, had opposed the concept, believing that schools and local governments were best placed to make decisions about their own teaching. However, proponents argued that the decentralised education system produced poor outcomes and entrenched inequality.

By March 2017, pro-standards forces had managed to create a broad coalition of educators, foundations, and politicians from across the political spectrum in favour of a national framework for education. Under President Dilma Rousseff, the coalition had supported the writing of two drafts of the framework, known as the Base Nacional Comum Curricular (BNCC). Furthermore, the coalition had managed to survive Rousseff’s impeachment and the deep polarisation that accompanied it. (See Exhibit 1 for a timeline of key events.) The government of President Michel Temer, who succeeded Rousseff, was more conservative, yet chose to continue the drafting process and had managed to maintain support from the left for the latest draft of the BNCC. Temer’s education ministry now had to send the BNCC to the National Council of Education (CNE), a body delegated by Brazil’s Congress to have the deciding vote on the standards.

However, just as the ministry was finalising the draft to send to the council, new opposition from Christian evangelicals was threatening the entire process. Evangelicals were a powerful force in Brazilian politics, and the Temer government benefitted from the votes of many evangelical members of Congress for its day-to-day business (see Exhibit 2). These representatives, having seen the BNCC draft, told the ministry leadership that they would block Temer’s legislative agenda unless the ministry removed references to gender identity and sexuality from the BNCC. The references, which supporters said would promote gender and LGBT equality, were backed by many in the coalition that had negotiated the BNCC over the years.

The decision whether to comply with the evangelicals’ demands fell to Maria Helena Guimarães de Castro, the executive secretary of the ministry and head of the steering committee for the BNCC. Castro believed strongly in the unique, transformative opportunity for educational improvement that the BNCC presented. If she complied with the demands, Castro could preserve the core of the BNCC reforms. But the move would likely alienate longstanding members of the wider coalition on whose cooperation hinged future reforms, as well as the successful implementation of the BNCC.

The alternative, eschewing the evangelicals, would also be costly; their threat was a potent one as the evangelicals were an important part of the president’s coalition. In Brazil, it was often difficult for presidents to get bills passed as elections neared, and Temer wanted to push
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through his signature pension and labour reforms ahead of the 2018 elections. Furthermore, the evangelicals could put their weight behind a new bill, which would take the power to vote on the BNCC from the CNE and give it to Congress. If that bill passed, Brazil’s polarised and mercurial Congress could then reopen and revise any or all of the BNCC draft, potentially undoing years of delicate negotiations amongst education experts.

Education in Brazil

In Brazil, all education up to the end of secondary school was compulsory and was known as ‘basic education’. Of the over 40 million pupils in basic education in the mid-2010s, four-fifths were enrolled in tuition-free public institutions. The remaining fifth, typically children of a higher socio-economic status, attended schools in the extensive private system.

The provision of education in Brazil was the shared responsibility of the federal government and the federative entities (the 26 states, one federal district, and over 5,500 municipalities). Municipal governments were responsible for early childhood education (ages 0-5). States and municipalities shared responsibility for primary education (Year 1-5); lower secondary education (Year 6-9) and upper secondary (Grade 1-3) was largely provided by state governments. Tertiary education was largely provided by the federal government. (See Exhibit 3 for the structure of Brazil’s education system.) The federal government was also responsible for funding and distributing resources, and the federal education ministry defined the national policy for all levels. The ministry was headed by a minister appointed by the president and supported by secretaries (appointed by the minister), with the most senior being the executive secretary and the secretaries for basic and higher education (see Exhibit 4).

The other federal decision-making body in education policy was the National Council of Education (CNE). The council advised on and monitored the design and implementation of national education policy, and it voted on key policy issues. It consisted of two chambers – one for basic and one for higher education – each with 12 councillors, who held four-year terms, with half appointed every two years. Of the 24 total councillors, there were two ‘natural members’ – the secretaries of basic and higher education in the ministry. The remainder were appointed by the president, but the law required that at least half were appointed from nominees prepared in consultation with civil society entities, educational associations, and state and municipal educational authorities.

At a local level, two bodies represented the interests of the local education networks: the National Council of Education Secretaries (CONSED) for state education secretaries, and the National Union of Municipal Education Managers (UNDIME) for municipal secretaries. Although not legally mandated, custom gave CONSED and UNDIME the right to nominate one councillor each to sit on the CNE.

This system of shared responsibility was based on principles of decentralisation, autonomy, and interdependence. Following the end of the highly-centralised military dictatorship in 1985, a demand for local autonomy in social policy, including education, emerged. In theory, local governments would have the power to respond to local needs, while coordination across regions would enable good policies throughout the nation. In this system, states and municipalities would have autonomy within federal guidelines to decide upon such matters as teaching methods, hiring, developing public-private partnerships, and setting curricula.

After re-democratisation, Brazil saw marked improvements in educational outcomes. Adult literacy increased from 75% to 90% between the late 1980s and the 2010s. During the same period, the country achieved universal primary enrolment and halved the proportion of children delayed in schooling.

However, many critics argued that the system was ineffective. In practice, critics said, collaboration was low, federal guidelines were loose, and the education system was marked...
by heterogeneity. This heterogeneity raised concerns about equity, as student attainment varied widely across regions, even when controlling for socioeconomic differences. Furthermore, despite spending around 4.2% of GDP on basic education (the OECD average was 3.3%), Brazil ranked in the bottom 20% of countries that participated in the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment in 2012 for all assessed subjects. According to domestic testing, in 2011 only 40% of students in the fifth year of schooling were at the ‘adequate’ level in Portuguese, and just 36% in mathematics.

To improve outcomes and accountability, and to reduce disparities, the federal government had passed a series of national reforms beginning in the 1990s. New funding programmes redistributed federal taxes to poorer regions to finance education, linked funds to enrolment rates, and stipulated minimum per-pupil expenditures. Yet, while equity of funding across regions improved, inequality in learning outcomes remained. In addition, the federal government introduced reforms to improve school evaluations, by assessing students every two years and providing a single indicator for comparing schools across Brazil. However, although Brazil had national assessments by the 2000s, there was no national curriculum in place to which teachers could refer. Instead, curricula were set by local education systems.

Early debates on national learning standards

The idea of a national framework for designing curricula had been discussed in Brazil since the end of the dictatorship. The 1988 Constitution included an article which read, ‘Minimum curricula shall be established for elementary schools in order to ensure a common basic education…’, and the 1996 Education Law gave the federal government the responsibility to ‘establish, in collaboration with the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities, … guidelines for early childhood education, primary and secondary education, which will guide the curricula and their minimum contents, in order to ensure common basic education.’

Nonetheless, there was considerable opposition to the idea of a centralised framework, particularly from educational associations and teachers’ unions. Decentralised policies were considered more democratic in the re-democratising country, local governments were seen as more attune to the needs of their own schools, and many Brazilian educators believed that education design should be student-centred. Largely due to this opposition, by the early 2010s, the federal government had made little headway in fulfilling its responsibility to create national standards laid out in the constitution and 1996 law.

But interest in centralised curricula was growing around the world. Academic studies into curriculum design suggested that consistent learning standards were linked to higher student achievement and reduced inequality. In the United States, the influential Gates Foundation was leading the push for consistent educational standards across the country known as the Common Core. Elsewhere, philanthropies and international organisations such as the World Bank were encouraging the centralisation of both curricula and assessments. In Brazil, among the proponents of a national framework for curricula was Maria Helena Guimarães de Castro.

Maria Helena Guimarães de Castro

Castro was a sociologist, teacher, and professor of political science, with a long career in education policy. She was a member of one of Brazil’s largest political parties, the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB). During the last PSDB administration (Fernando Henrique Cardoso; 1995-2002), Castro had worked in the Ministry of Education as the president of the National Institute of Educational Studies and Research, as well as briefly as interim minister in 2001. She had also been involved in local education administration, having served as
municipal secretary of education in Campinas and president of UNDIME, as well as state secretary of education in both the Federal District and São Paulo.\textsuperscript{41}

Castro was an advocate of curriculum reform. In São Paulo, she had worked to implement a common curriculum for the entire state network, one of the largest school systems in the whole of Latin America, serving 2.5 million students.\textsuperscript{42} During the process Castro was critical of the excessive autonomy, ‘pedagogical fragmentation’ and ‘disorganization’ in the state’s schools and the ‘mistaken belief that confused school autonomy with doing whatever you want’.\textsuperscript{43} The process of standardisation in São Paulo, however, was marred in 2009 by the criticism of teaching materials after 500,000 geography textbooks in the state were recalled following serious printing errors, including a map of South America showing two Paraguays.\textsuperscript{44}

Despite the obstacles, Castro’s reform efforts in São Paulo caught the attention of the Lemann Foundation, which was becoming increasingly interested in national standards in the 2010s. The foundation was keen to start building a network of individuals interested in national standards from across Brazil’s diverse political spectrum.\textsuperscript{45}

**Politics in Brazil**

Since the return to democracy in 1985, Brazilian politics was characterised by what scholars called ‘coalitional presidentialism’, in which presidents were constrained by permanent legislative minorities, and so had to rely on multiparty coalitions to pass their legislative agendas.\textsuperscript{46} However, unlike in parliamentary systems, if presidents lost the support of a majority of the legislature, they remained in office but were unable to push through bills. Presidents thus often needed to purchase governability through an exchange of favours, for example, by giving ministerial positions to potential allies.\textsuperscript{47}

Among the electorate, individual personalities often counted for more than party affiliation. In the early 2010s, no one seemed to epitomise the importance of personality in Brazilian politics more than former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, usually referred to as Lula.\textsuperscript{48} Lula was a founding member of the Worker’s Party (PT) and served as president from 2003 to 2010. During Lula’s presidency, the country achieved high economic growth fuelled by a commodities boom that, coupled with reforms, pulled many Brazilians out of poverty and reduced inequality.\textsuperscript{49} By the time Lula left office, he had a personal approval rating of 87%.\textsuperscript{50} Lula’s popularity helped to secure the presidency for his chosen successor, Dilma Rousseff, also of the PT.\textsuperscript{51} Rousseff was an economist and a former left-wing militia member.\textsuperscript{52} For most of her first term, from 2010 to 2014, the country experienced a growing economy and in early 2013, Rousseff’s approval was in the range that Lula had enjoyed.\textsuperscript{53}

Despite Rousseff’s high approval rating, however, the PT had just 88 out of 513 total seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Brazil’s lower house).\textsuperscript{54} Brazil had an unusually high number of political parties, with a low concentration of power. After the 2010 elections, 22 parties had at least one seat in the Chamber of Deputies. The PT was the largest party, followed by the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the PSDB (to which Castro belonged), with 78 and 54 seats each.\textsuperscript{55}

While the PT was typically classified as left-wing, and the PSDB and PMDB as further to the right (see Exhibit 5a), the Brazilian political spectrum did not map neatly onto understandings of left and right often used in other parts of the world. In Brazil, the political spectrum was characterised on the right by traditional values, and on the left by more progressive values, but other political commitments were less easy to categorise (see Exhibit 5b). In addition, Brazilian party politics was characterised by low party discipline, considerable ideological diversity within parties, and frequent migration of politicians between parties.\textsuperscript{56}

It was from across this fractured political spectrum, that the Lemann Foundation hoped to build a coalition of education reform advocates to form a movement for national standards.
Building the coalition

The Lemann foundation was created in 2002 by Jorge Paulo Lemann, a businessman and the wealthiest person in the country. Its initial purpose was “to improve management and evaluation in education.” 57 Under new leadership in the early 2010s, the Lemann Foundation decided to pursue the goal of national standards of education in Brazil.

In 2013, representatives of the foundation invited Castro, then 66 years old and a member of the São Paulo State Board of Education, to the United States for a seminar entitled, ‘Leading educational reforms: strengthening Brazil for the 21st century.’ 58 Castro was among 30 guests – government officials, state education secretaries, and representatives of other foundations and NGOs – from across the political spectrum in Brazil. 59 Some associated with the PT and others, like Castro, from opposition parties; they were used to having antagonistic relationships with one another. In fact, Denis Mizne, the CEO of the Lemann Foundation, remembered how one guest, on landing in the United States and seeing the other invitees arrive, refused to board the bus to the seminar. 60 But eventually the group arrived at the destination, and there they listened to speakers including those who had worked on the US Common Core.

By the end of the seminar, the group, and Castro among them, formed the Movimento pela Base Nacional Comum, a coalition of government and non-government actors committed to creating national standards in Brazil. 61 The Movimento pela Base would meet regularly and their first goal would be to get a discussion of national standards onto the legislative agenda and into the National Education Plan, which was currently under debate in Congress. 62

The National Education Plan

Every 10 years, the Brazilian government published a national education plan outlining the educational objectives for the decade. 63 By the time the Movimento pela Base was created in 2013, the current plan had been stalled in Congress for two years. But after extensive debate, the plan was eventually passed in 2014, and it included an early victory for the movement. 64

The new law required the Ministry of Education to write a ‘proposal of rights and objectives of learning and development for students of elementary school... in articulation and collaboration with the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities... and preceded by national public consultation.’ 65 The ministry was to send this proposal of national standards – which later became the BNCC – to the CNE by June 2016. 66 The CNE would assess the proposal in a bicameral commission, amend it as necessary, and then hold a majority-based vote on its passage. 67 If the vote was successful, the BNCC would return to the minister of education for approval, before becoming a national norm. 68

The National Education Plan was thus a boost to the Movimento pela Base and pro-standards advocates in Brazil. 69 But, as Rebecca Tarlau and Kathryn Moeller, two academics studying education reform in Brazil, put it, ‘the fact that this deadline was inscribed in the legislation did not necessarily mean that it would be supported. On the contrary, the 2014 plan had many public policy objectives that were unlikely to be approved.’ 70 Nonetheless, the Ministry of Education began working on the BNCC and created working groups, drawing on experts from the top educational institutions and associations in the country, to start drafting the standards.

The first draft

Just six months after the passage of the National Education Plan, the re-election of President Rousseff in 2014 led to changes in the leadership of the ministry and a rethinking of the strategy for drafting the BNCC. After Rousseff’s inauguration, she put a new minister, Cid Gomes, in charge of education. In February, Gomes appointed Manuel Palácios, a professor in education, as secretary of basic education and gave Palácios responsibility for overseeing the first draft of the BNCC. 71
For Palácios, the most important goal was to get the states and municipalities, represented by CONSED and UNDIME, on board with the standards. Politically, it was crucial to be seen to have the support of local actors. The ministry also recognised that the support of local actors would be essential for implementing the standards once approved, so it was prudent to have them involved in crafting the proposals – the BNCC needed to be a bottom-up as well as a top-down project.  

Palácios took stock of the situation at the ministry. The previous administration had created working groups, drawn from Brazil’s top educational institutions and associations, to prepare proposals for the BNCC, but in Palácios’s view their work had stalled. What they had produced so far was more of a philosophical document describing students’ rights (e.g., to local cultural practices and to diverse knowledge), than a technocratic one that would detail learning objectives to be achieved (e.g., competence in algebra and trigonometry). Palácios believed the working groups were too heavily influenced by deconstructionism prevalent in the educational institutions, which held that having consensus on learning objectives was impossible and attempting to create such was a political, even violent, act.

Palácios decided to ‘start [the drafting process] all over again from scratch.’ The most important thing,’ Palácios reflected, ‘was to move the discussion of the BNCC from the conceptual to the practical.’ To produce the sort of document he wanted, Palácios knew he needed to change the working groups and circumvent the ideological opposition to competence-oriented standards. However, Palácios also knew the BNCC would need to be approved by the CNE, many of whose members had strong links to the educational associations and teachers’ unions. ‘If we wanted them to vote against the educational associations, we had to build a bridge,’ Palácios reflected. And while the vote in the CNE would be simple-majority-based, Palácios was aiming for a broad consensus, which he felt was necessary to ensure the legitimacy and the implementation of the BNCC.

Palácios thus created new working groups based around academic subjects, removing the members from the educational associations and institutions where the opposition was centred, and bringing in subject-specific academic experts (e.g., representatives of the science or mathematics associations) and representatives of local governments, such as from CONSED and UNDIME. The new subject-area groups were instructed to work on learning objectives, not on the school experience. ‘The goal,’ according to Palácios, ‘was to give left-wing parties the room to support us … once we had the support of the left-wing parties, it rendered the left-wing opposition (e.g., in the educational associations) isolated.’ The gamble paid off. When Minister Gomes was replaced by a new minister, Renato Janine Ribeiro, in March 2015, Ribeiro was able to withstand pressure from educational associations calling for Palácios’s removal.

By September 2015, the new working groups had produced a first draft and sent it to the CNE for feedback. Despite Palácios’s manoeuvring however, the document was roundly criticised. From the left, the graduate education associations attacked the standards, writing that the draft had ignored ‘the whole history of debate about curriculum in the Brazilian academy.’ The right-wing group Escola Sem Partido led the conservative opposition to the BNCC, which criticised the influence of leftist parties in the drafting and accused Palácios of being an educational populist trying to build the standards by committee. History became a particularly controversial topic, with those on the left pushing for more Afro-Brazilian and Indigenous history, and those on the right arguing for topics that situated Brazil in the history of the West. Even the most vocal proponents of the BNCC inside the Movimento pela Base agreed that the draft was poor; nonetheless, as Camila Pereira, director of education at the Lemann Foundation, put it, Palácios ‘had moved the debate on from if we need standards to what should be in the standards. We’d been talking about “if” since the 1980s.’

As the discussion turned to what should be in the standards, the ministry opened online consultations, asking teachers and those involved in education from across the country to read and comment on the draft. Ultimately, 300,000 people left over 12 million comments.
The ministry hoped to draw on the comments in the second draft, a daunting task that looked likely to take a considerable amount of time. However, as 2016 began, political pressures within the country meant time was running short for the Rousseff administration.

**Rising polarisation**

Rousseff’s political position had been deteriorating since 2013. Although she had started 2013 with high approval ratings, that summer saw major protests that started in response to bus fare increases, but soon encompassed a range of grievances and caused widespread disruption. The following year, although Rousseff was re-elected, the election campaign was extremely acrimonious. Meanwhile, the commodity boom which had been fuelling the Brazilian economy ended and the country entered a deep recession.

Then, beginning in 2014, the country faced its largest corruption scandal in modern history. Dubbed Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash), the scandal began as an investigation into bribery at the state-owned oil company, Petrobrás, and rapidly grew until a huge number of politicians were implicated in the corruption findings. By mid-2016, more than 60% of legislators were under judicial investigation. While no political parties emerged unscathed, the reputations of Rousseff and the PT were particularly tainted. The former treasurer of the PT was given a 15-year prison sentence for channelling bribes into party funds, and Lula himself was detained for questioning. When Rousseff tried to appoint Lula as her chief of staff, many interpreted the move as an attempt to shield her patron from prosecution. Amid large protests, a federal judge blocked the appointment and prosecutors charged Lula with money laundering. With new revelations in the corruption scandal constantly appearing, and with the economy struggling, Rousseff’s approval rating plummeted to just 10% by April 2016.

By that time, Rousseff was facing a political crisis. In December 2015, the president of the Chamber of Deputies had accepted a petition for her impeachment, with the vote due in April 2016. Despite the extensive corruption revealed by the Lava Jato investigations, Rousseff’s opponents (many of whom were themselves implicated by the revelations) were not accusing her of accepting bribes. Instead, she was accused of malpractice in government accounting – using funds from the state banks to cover gaps in her budget, a practice she claimed was commonplace.

As Rousseff and the PT struggled, opposition forces mounted. However, while the number of antipetistas – that is, Brazilians who were opposed to the PT – grew, the traditional parties did not benefit. By 2016, 72% of Brazilians said they felt close to none of Brazil’s parties, the highest percentage on record. Instead, as The Guardian noted, ‘disillusioned Brazilians [were] increasingly looking to free-market liberals, evangelical Christians, and rightwing populists.’

In the Chamber of Deputies too, the importance of parties was waning, and losing ground to caucuses, although the salience of caucus membership varied from issue to issue. On the right, three powerful caucuses emerged and together gained the nickname the ‘BBB bench’ (for bullets, bibles, and beef); they represented gun rights activists, evangelical Christians, and agricultural interests, respectively.

Evangelicals had been a growing force in Brazilian politics since the ‘Pentecostal boom’ of the late 20th century. In particular, evangelicalism appealed to many poorer Brazilians, for whom churches provided social services that tackled serious social issues in communities where state interventions often seemed inadequate. Politically, evangelicals wanted to guarantee religious freedom and supported policies that they interpreted as protecting the traditional family and ‘Christian morals.’

By 2015, the evangelical caucus in the Brazilian Congress boasted 199 deputies (out of 513) and four senators (out of 81). The caucus was not a homogenous bloc; instead it was a cross-...
party group including members from traditionally conservative parties as well as leftist ones like the PT and representing a large number of rival churches. With such fragmentation, the caucus did not often vote cohesively; however, the caucus tended to vote uniformly on moral matters concerning ‘traditional Christian values’. The caucus’s opponents worried about its influence, which they believed was an impediment to progress towards gender and LGBT equality, noting that in 2015 Brazil had the 7th highest rate of femicide in the world and the highest rate of violence against trans people. Evangelicals, in contrast, were concerned about the growing influence of so-called ‘gender ideology’, which they saw as a progressive agenda to undermine family and religious values and promote immorality. During the Rousseff government, the evangelical bench had managed to exert influence over policies concerning abortion and LGBT rights, and by 2016, evangelicals were at the forefront of the impeachment proceedings. (See Exhibit 6 for more on evangelicals in Brazilian politics.)

The second draft

Back at the education ministry, with impeachment looming and antipetista sentiment growing, Palácios worried for the future of the BNCC. They had a second draft that was almost ready, but with such anti-PT feeling, it looked as if the next government would reverse many of the policies and programmes begun under Rousseff, potentially scrapping the BNCC altogether.

Palácios had to decide whether to send the standards to the CNE for the next round of feedback before impeachment, which might undermine their legitimacy if they were rushed through, or to postpone and hope that the next government would publish them. He also knew that the term for half of the CNE councillors was almost over, and twelve new candidates who would be voting on the BNCC needed to be appointed.

Impeachment

On 17 April 2016, 367 out of 513 members of the Chamber of Deputies voted to back impeachment, above the two-thirds majority of 342 needed to send the case to the Senate. (See Exhibit 7 for a breakdown of the vote by party.) Rousseff was suspended from office on 12 May and her vice president, Michel Temer of the PMDB, took over as head of state. The moment marked a political crisis in Brazil between PT supporters who believed impeachment was a coup and the new government was illegitimate, and the antipetistas who saw the PT as a corrupt organisation that had abandoned their own standards of governance.

At the Ministry of Education, on 3 May, Palácios took the decision to send the BNCC draft to the CNE. Castro also decided to act. Despite her long-term Movimento pela Base membership, Lemann Foundation CEO Minze remembered that Castro had been largely critical of the drafting process conducted under the PT. However, on 3 May, Castro co-wrote an article in defence of the standards with two Movimento pela Base colleagues from across the political spectrum. Castro and her co-authors wrote, ‘continuing with the construction and implementation of the [BNCC], without stoppages or setbacks, is a commitment that must be assumed by everyone.’ The letter was signed by 39 other Movimento pela Base members and published in one of the biggest Brazilian newspapers, Folha de S.Paulo.

Then, on 11 May, the night before Rousseff’s suspension, Rousseff’s education minister announced new appointees to the council. According to Palácios, some of the last-minute appointments were appointed ‘as an act of resistance… there were people appointed who were clearly part of the unions and who had not been on the CNE before.’ Furthermore, Palácios knew that some of these new appointees might resist the standards.

When Temer took office the following day on 12 May, he announced his new, all-male cabinet. As education minister, Temer appointed José Mendonça Filho, a federal deputy from the Democratic Party (DEM), who described himself as ‘a leader of impeachment’. Mendonça selected Rossieli Soares, a former state secretary of education, to replace Palácios.

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as secretary of basic education, and chose Castro to take on the number-two role in the ministry: executive secretary. Castro agreed to accept on condition that the BNCC would be a priority for the new leadership. Mendonça consented and appointed Castro to steer the BNCC committee, responsible for preparing the third, and final, draft of the standards.

Meanwhile, the new administration was attempting to block the last-minute appointments the Rousseff government had made to the CNE. According to Palácios, the new administration found a technicality – that the new members had been appointed but not yet confirmed – which allowed the new administration to annul the appointments and instead appoint their own picks from the nominee lists. The new CNE was thus comprised of both Rousseff and Temer appointees (see Exhibit 8). According to Palácios, it was ‘composed of centre-left and centre-right people sensitive to public opinion and especially to their parties.’ As head of the bicameral committee for the BNCC, the councillors elected Cesar Callegari, a sociologist who had worked in both the Rousseff and Lula administrations and who saw impeachment as a ‘civil and media coup’. According to Callegari, members of the Temer administration tried to oppose his election – ‘They saw me as someone to the left,’ he said – but were unsuccessful. Callegari’s election showed that despite the political changes, the left remained powerful within the CNE. And when it came to the BNCC, Callegari’s vote was seen as the most crucial. As Palácios, no longer in the ministry, put it, ‘at the CNE the strongest opposition was from the left – once you had their support, the standards would pass.’

Preparing the third draft

With the new councillors in place, Castro got to work on preparing a final draft of the BNCC. The government formally announced a postponement of the original June 2016 deadline but pushed forward with public consultations in conjunction with CONSED and UNDIME in the summer of 2016. The consultation seminars, which took place across Brazil, were heated at times, and in one state they were attended by anti-impeachment protestors. Even technical aspects of the consultations were politicised, with much of the conflict focussed on which topics would be taught in history classes. At the same time, the Lemann Foundation commissioned many studies from international and domestic experts, which came back with recommendations and suggestions for the third draft.

However, the involvement of foundations like Lemann was drawing criticism. According to Callegari, the fact that the ministry was working with private foundations ‘gave certain sectors the ammunition to claim that the BNCC had been prepared by businessmen, not educational experts.’ Paulo Blikstein, a professor of education who was involved in early drafting of the standards, told interviewers, ‘We were lucky that the foundations involved were benign and well-intentioned. But there was concern in Brazil about the fact that they were not elected institutions.’ Meanwhile, in the United States, the Gates Foundation had recently issued an apology for missteps in the creation of the US Common Core, which was increasingly under fire for being disruptive and ineffective, and which had inspired the Yale seminar where the Movimento pela Base was founded. In a statement, the Gates Foundation wrote, ‘[we] underestimated the level of resources and support required for our public education systems to be well equipped to implement the standards. We missed an early opportunity to sufficiently engage educators … [so that] the standards could take flight from the beginning.’

Back in Brazil, the legitimacy of Temer’s education policies was also declining. In September 2016, the government passed a controversial high school reform through a provisional measure. The reform, which had first been introduced under the PT, allowed schools to choose to offer students one of five ‘training itineraries’ (i.e., a specialisation, for example, in languages). According to scholars of Brazilian education policy Rebecca Tarlau and Kathryn Moeller, ‘although the idea of this reform was proposed under the Dilma government, the imposition of this policy through provisional measure – and under a new regime, which many considered illegitimate – was [widely considered] outrageous.’ In contrast, others defended the legitimacy of the process. Provisional measures, they said, were used by all
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previous governments to expedite projects and were fully democratic, requiring approval by the national Congress within 120 days.\textsuperscript{138}

Education was becoming a touchstone for polarisation. On the right, the Escola sem Partido was growing in influence. The group, which was closely affiliated with evangelicals, was against what its supporters believed was ‘the political-ideological contamination of Brazilian schools’, against teachers ‘transmitting to the children of others their own religious and moral values’, and specifically against ‘gender ideology’ being taught in schools.\textsuperscript{139} In contrast, progressives like those in the Professores Contra o Escola Sem Partido insisted that ‘gender ideology’ did not exist and argued that, ‘As we live in an extremely violent society against women, children, and LGBTs, we need to discuss gender at school to try to change this reality.’\textsuperscript{140} Among LGBT campaigners’ demands were educational materials combatting homophobia and the right to use a ‘social name’ (i.e., a chosen, as opposed to a birth, name, typically adopted by transgender people) in official educational settings.\textsuperscript{141} The demands were poorly received among conservative circles, who gave the educational materials the derisive nickname of ‘the gay kit’.\textsuperscript{142} The resulting vitriol spurred right-wing politicians into the spotlight, including the newly-announced presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro, an outspoken opponent of the ‘gay kit’ and the supposed ‘sexualization of children in schools’.\textsuperscript{143}

With elections looming in 2018, a sense of urgency and uncertainty was growing in the Temer administration, including at the education ministry. But speeding up the BNCC process was opposed by those on the left, many of whom saw rushing the standards as authoritarian. For Blikstein, there had not been enough time or resources to properly incorporate the results of the consultations. Many thousands of people had commented on the standards, both in person and online, and Blikstein believed ‘there was no systematic way for incorporating [the feedback]. Many comments contradicted each other, which would require hard, time-consuming decisions. Some comments came from curriculum specialists or teachers, others from people with no training or experience in K-12 education. Some comments were more technical, others had a political agenda. It was impossible to distinguish them. Because of these factors and the sheer amount of comments, in the end, most were discarded.’\textsuperscript{144}

Despite these concerns, Castro forged ahead. Drafting the BNCC for high school education would need to wait until the new high school reform was approved by Congress, so the ministry decided to split the BNCC into two projects. For now, they would continue drafting the standards for education up to school Year 9 (see \textit{Exhibit 3}) and then pick up the BNCC for the high school grades at a later date.\textsuperscript{145} In January 2017, Castro organised a week at a hotel in São Paulo that would bring together different working groups and representatives from each state to do a critical reading of the first attempt at the final draft of the BNCC for elementary education.\textsuperscript{146} By March 2017, following several rounds of further discussions, Castro had a draft to share with the minister.\textsuperscript{147} The next step would be to send the draft to the CNE.

Demands and compromises

As the third draft was being finalised, some voices continued to oppose the BNCC. One Brazilian educational consultant, for example, believed the standards were poor and already outdated, with inconsistencies resulting from the rushed process, lack of communication between multiple teams of government officials and consultants, lack of transparency and from a coalition mostly driven by private-sector and foundation managers who pushed for completion rather than quality.\textsuperscript{148} These opponents called on the CNE and Callegari, in particular, to block the standards when they arrived.\textsuperscript{149} But while Callegari had his own reservations about the standards, he reflected that the standards ‘had been prepared by many hands, and this memory had helped to attenuate the proposal put forward by [the] Temer [administration].’\textsuperscript{150} To further increase this sense of continuity, the ministry produced a document showing every change between the second and third versions of the BNCC, and the justification for each change based on feedback from CONSED and UNDIME.\textsuperscript{151}
With the CNE’s tacit support, the ministry prepared to officially send the final draft to the council for a vote. However, the ministry had just released embargoed copies to journalists when they were approached by representatives of the evangelical caucus. The caucus produced a list of issues that they wanted the ministry to address, mainly concerning mentions of gender or sexuality, which the evangelicals wanted removed from the document. This would be a departure from the first and second BNCC drafts, which had both included numerous mentions of gender and sexuality. Among the most notable changes the caucus demanded was deleting ‘gender’ and ‘sexual orientation’ from the 10 general competencies the ministry had issued as framing the whole BNCC (see Exhibit 9).

According to Mendonça, the evangelical representatives asserted that, if the references were not removed, ‘they would attempt to block any important proposal from the Temer government’ that was introduced to Congress. Many of the evangelical caucus were part of Temer’s coalition (see Exhibit 2); if they decided to withdraw their support, Temer’s legislative agenda could be in trouble. Temer’s labour reform required a simple majority; however, his pension reform, which would raise the retirement age from an average of 54 to a minimum of 65, needed a 60% super majority. Moreover, the Temer government had several economic bills in the works, without which Mendonça believed the economy would suffer.

In addition, the representatives also threatened to throw their support behind a new bill which had recently been introduced and that would change the National Education Plan such that the power to vote on the BNCC would be taken from the CNE and given to Congress. Mendonça believed that if the bill passed and the BNCC were debated in Congress, it would become a much more conservative document, something Castro would have to consider. In contrast, the evangelicals had no representation on the council.

Changing the draft now might jeopardise the BNCC’s chances of passage in the CNE. However, Castro believed there could be opportunities to create policies outside of the BNCC agenda that would appeal to LGBT representatives, perhaps regarding ongoing talks around the use of social names.

More broadly, Castro’s decision could have future repercussions. Castro would need to maintain the support of the CNE for further reforms, such as the BNCC for high school, which the ministry intended to turn to next, and planned changes to student financing, which the administration hoped would expand access to higher education. The Rousseff appointees would likely tolerate only a limited number of compromises with a government that many on the left saw as illegitimate – after all, Temer had not been elected and he was reversing many of the policies of Rousseff, who had been elected just 2 years before. Nor would this single concession likely satisfy the evangelical right; the Escola sem Partido movement, for example, had a much larger agenda. Among the policies they wanted was filming in classrooms to allow parents to observe what children were being taught and legal prohibitions against teaching ‘gender ideology’ in classrooms. A victory now could embolden the evangelical representatives in future policy discussions. Furthermore, evangelical candidates could take such a success to voters to help position themselves, in the words of one of the caucus members, as ‘tireless fighter[s] for the family’ in the upcoming elections.

With much to consider and with the draft already in the hands of the journalists, Castro needed to act.
**Exhibit 1: Timeline of key events**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Brazil’s new Constitution establishes that there must be national learning standards for the elementary school level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Yale seminar organised by the Lemann Foundation to discuss the standards. The attendees commit to forming the Movimento pela Base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>The National Education Plan is passed, laying out a process and a timeline for establishing the BNCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Dilma Rousseff begins her second term as president. Manuel Palácios becomes Secretary for Basic Education at the Ministry of Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>The Ministry of Education publishes the first draft of the BNCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April 2016</td>
<td>The Chamber of Deputies votes in favour of impeaching President Rousseff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May 2016</td>
<td>The Ministry of Education publishes the second draft of the BNCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May 2016</td>
<td>The Ministry of Education appoints 12 new councillors to the National Council of Education (CNE).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May 2016</td>
<td>Rousseff is suspended from office and Vice President Michel Temer replaces her. At the Ministry of Education, José Mendonça Filho becomes the new minister of education and Maria Helena Guimarães de Castro becomes the new executive secretary. The ministry blocks the Rousseff appointments to the CNE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June-August 2016</td>
<td>The second draft of the BNCC is discussed in seminars across Brazil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August 2016</td>
<td>President Rousseff is impeached by the Senate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2017</td>
<td>The Ministry of Education prepares to send the final draft of the BNCC to the CNE but are approached by representatives from the evangelical caucus who would like the ministry to remove references to ‘gender ideology’ from the BNCC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Compiled by case writers.
Exhibit 2: The evangelical caucus in the Chamber of Deputies

- 22.3% Coalition party members in the evangelical caucus
- 16.4% Coalition party members not in the evangelical caucus
- 35.2% Opposition and independent party members not in the evangelical caucus
- 26.0% Opposition and independent party members in the evangelical caucus

**Notes:** The pie chart shows the proportion of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies occupied by members of the evangelical caucus in parties that were part of President Temer’s coalition in March 2017. Other sources may show different coalition compositions.

### Exhibit 3: The structure of Brazil’s education system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Starting age</th>
<th>Administrative unit (primary responsibility)</th>
<th>Grade/Year</th>
<th>Education programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23+</td>
<td>Federal government and states</td>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>Doctoral degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Academic master’s degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Professional master’s degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Specific professional diploma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Licentiate’s degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>Grade 3</td>
<td>Upper secondary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>Year 9</td>
<td>Lower secondary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>Year 5</td>
<td>Primary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Municipalities and states</td>
<td>Basic education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Municipalities and states</td>
<td>Year 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Early childhood educational development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exhibit 4: Organisation of the Ministry of Education

Exhibit 5a: Legislators’ assessments of party ideological placement within the Brazilian political spectrum

Notes: This chart is based on data from the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (BLS; 1990-2017). Over three decades and eight waves, the BLS tracked and recorded the beliefs of Brazilian legislators. While there are limitations to the data collected, e.g., only around 150 legislators respond to the survey each wave, it is considered among the best datasets available for understanding the beliefs of Brazil’s political elite. For the data used in this chart, legislators were asked to place each party included in the survey on a scale of 1 (‘more left’) to 10 (‘more right’). Gaps occur either because the party did not exist at the time of the wave of the survey or was considered too small to merit inclusion in the survey. The parties are ordered based on their position in Wave 8 (2017) from top (‘more right’) to bottom (‘more left’).

Exhibit 5b: Legislators’ views on questions of social and economic policies by party, showing party medians and interquartile ranges

Notes: This chart is based on data from Wave 8 of the BLS (2017). Legislators were asked to position themselves on a scale of 1 to 5 regarding a number of ideological parameters, and then the average among respondents for each party is shown. In the chart above, 1 represents more typically ‘left-wing’ stances while 5 represents more typically ‘right-wing’ views. The parties are ordered according to legislators’ assessments of the ideological placement of each party in 2017 (see Exhibit 5a) with ‘more right’ parties at the top and ‘more left’ parties at the bottom.

Exhibit 6: Evangelical Christians in Brazilian politics

Brazil was traditionally a Catholic country but, beginning in the 1970s, and accelerating in the early 2000s, there was a sustained demographic shift away from Catholicism towards Protestantism, particularly evangelicalism. Evangelicals were typically identified by their commitment to social conservatism and to the practice of continuous evangelism. In Brazil, the term referred to a highly diverse group of religious communities that included ‘historical protestants’ (such as Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians, and Anglicans), as well as more recently formed nondenominational, Pentecostal, and neo-Pentecostal groups. These churches competed with each other and the Catholic church for members and resources.

Some of Brazil’s evangelical churches, such as the Christian Congregation, forbade involvement with politics and, prior to re-democratisation in 1985, a classic evangelical saying was ‘Believers don’t mess with politics.’ However, by the 1990s, the new saying emerged – ‘Brother votes for brother’ – and more evangelicals entered politics. These new politically active evangelicals had disparate aims, but across the board they were broadly aligned on moral issues, particularly relating to gender and sexuality. Beyond morality, many church leaders also had interests in lobbying governments for tax exemptions, rights to radio and TV stations, and church involvement in public programmes such as those for drug users.

These evangelicals did not easily find a party home. As political scientist Erica Amy Smith put it in 2019, ‘the correlation between religion and partisanship [was] near zero’. One church, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Universal) – which boasted 12,000 pastors and almost 7 million followers in 2017 and which was often described as the most politically effective Pentecostal denomination – formed a political party called the Brazilian Republican Party (PRB). However, PRB membership was not limited to Universal members, nor to evangelicals. Without a party home for evangelical representatives in Congress, evangelical congressional politics were consolidated in the Evangelical Parliamentary Front of the National Congress (the evangelical caucus in the Chamber of Deputies), which had been formed in 2003 by the growing number of evangelical representatives. By 2017, 39% of representatives in the Chamber of Deputies were members of the evangelical caucus. Although just 16% of all representatives publicly identified as evangelicals (and a small minority of those who did were not members of the caucus), the caucus also attracted representatives who had a large evangelical base, as well as so-called ‘non-evangelical sympathisers’, such as members of the Charismatic Catholic Renewal, a branch of the Catholic Church heavily influenced by Pentecostalism. For example, Congressman Jair Bolsonaro had long been affiliated with the evangelical caucus despite identifying as a Catholic.

As a caucus, rather than a party, the group was not formally permitted to determine how members should vote, nor require members to follow voting directives. However, the caucus did monitor proposed legislation, draw members’ attention to votes, provide guidance to members on voting, and define action strategies, most typically to block or shelve objectionable propositions. As one deputy explained, ‘the evangelical bench does not take a stand, for example, on the CPMF [a financial transactions tax] vote … [But we] have a position that unites us when it comes to matters that violate some religious and moral principles, which we deem necessary for our intervention.’ The president of the caucus, PSDB member João Campos, explained that it was usually possible to achieve considerable unity in voting across caucus members, even those only loosely affiliated, when it came to such policies. The exception was abortion, as representatives connected to the (pro-choice) Universal would defect.

Given the importance of the evangelical caucus, the PT had formed a strategic alliance with them under Lula and Rousseff. The PT had promised to increase state partnerships with churches – for example in programmes for drug users – in exchange for parliamentary support. However, evangelical support for the PT had weakened in recent years, and 93% of the caucus
voted for Rousseff’s impeachment. Under Temer, traditional social issues remained important

to the caucus, particularly concerning LGBT rights. And according to Erica Amy Smith, in the
late 2010s, ‘on the national stage, public school curricula related to gender and sexuality
[were] at the top of [evangelical] agendas.’

**Source:** Erica Amy Smith, *Religion and Brazilian Democracy: mobilizing the people of God* (Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, 2019); Talita Bedinelli, ‘“Os parlamentares religiosos têm a ser mais conservadores do que a
população evangélica” [“Religious parliamentarians tend to be more conservative than the evangelical
population”] (Google Translate, 2022)’. *El País* (04 Dec 2017),
abriu espaço e legitimou os evangélicos na política” [“The left opened space and legitimized evangelicals in
politics”] (Google Translate, 2022)’. *El País* (31 Oct 2016),

and Politics: ideology and action of the ‘Evangelical Bench’ in the Federal Chamber (Google Translate, 2022)).
Exhibit 7: Votes for and against the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in the Chamber of Deputies, by party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes for impeachment</th>
<th>Votes against impeachment</th>
<th>Abstentions</th>
<th>Absent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ Party (PT)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB)</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Progressive Party (PP)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party of the Republic (PR)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (PSD)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats (DEM)</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian Republican Party (PRB)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazilian Labour Party (PTB)</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Labour Party (PDT)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solidarity (SD)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Labour Party (PTN)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Christian Party (PSC)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Socialist Party (PPS)</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanist Party of Solidarity (PHS)</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party (PV)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party of the Social Order (PROS)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability Network (REDE)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party of Brazil (PTdoB)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Ecologic Party (PEN)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Liberal Party (PSL)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Brazilian Women (PMB)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>367 (71.5%)</td>
<td>137 (26.7%)</td>
<td>7 (1.4%)</td>
<td>3 (0.6%)</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Exhibit 8: The composition of the CNE in March 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
<th>Member of the CNE when Sep 2015 statement in favour of gender and sexuality diversity was issued</th>
<th>Member of the CNE Commission on Discrimination, Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation in Sep 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rossieli Soares da Silva</td>
<td>Secretary of basic education</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Barone</td>
<td>Secretary of higher education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Cesar Russi Callegari</td>
<td>Rousseff appointee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Roquete de Macedo</td>
<td>Rousseff appointee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurina de Oliveira Santana</td>
<td>Rousseff appointee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco César de Sá Barreto</td>
<td>Rousseff appointee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilberto Gonçalves Garcia</td>
<td>Rousseff appointee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Cláudio Pereira Siqueira</td>
<td>Rousseff appointee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joaquim José Soares Neto</td>
<td>Rousseff appointee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Francisco Soares</td>
<td>Rousseff appointee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Márcia Ângela da Silva Aguilar</td>
<td>Rousseff appointee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malvina Tania Tuttman</td>
<td>Rousseff appointee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugo Okida</td>
<td>Rousseff appointee</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio de Araújo Freitas Júnior</td>
<td>Temer appointee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Carbonari Netto</td>
<td>Temer appointee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gersem José Dos Santos Luciano</td>
<td>Temer appointee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Loureiro Lopes</td>
<td>Temer appointee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Roberto Liza Curi</td>
<td>Temer appointee*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nílma Santos Fontanive</td>
<td>Temer appointee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raul Jean Louis Henry</td>
<td>Temer appointee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suely Melo de Castro Menezes</td>
<td>Temer appointee</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafael Esmeraldo Lucchesi Ramacciotti</td>
<td>Temer appointee*</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo Deschamps</td>
<td>CONSED nominee (appointed by Temer)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessio Costa Lima</td>
<td>UNDIME nominee (appointed by Temer)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** *Luiz Roberto Liza Curi and Rafael Esmeraldo Lucchesi Ramacciotti were first appointed to the council under Rousseff before being reappointed by Temer in 2016.

Exhibit 9: The 10 general competencies guiding the BNCC

The following competencies were issued by the Ministry of Education prior to the release of the third draft of the standards. The competencies were intended to ‘interrelate and permeate all areas/components’ of the standards. The objectionable clause was found in competency nine, highlighted in bold below.

Cognitive skills:
1. Master and value the knowledge built on the physical, social and cultural world to explain reality and assume, with critical awareness and responsibility, a proactive attitude towards contemporary challenges;
2. Exercise intellectual curiosity and use the proper scientific approach, including research, critical analysis, imagination and creativity, to investigate causes, develop and test hypotheses, formulate and solve problems and invent solutions based on knowledge from different areas;
3. Exercise the aesthetic sense to recognise, value and enjoy the various cultural manifestations, from local to global, as well as to participate in diversified practices of artistic-cultural production.

Communicative skills:
4. Exchange information, experiences and ideas in different contexts, based on knowledge of verbal (oral and written) and/or audio-visual (such as LIBRAS), corporal, multimodal, artistic, mathematical, scientific, technological and digital languages, to produce meanings that lead to mutual understanding;
5. Explain, through different languages, facts, information, phenomena and linguistic, cultural, social, economic, scientific, technological and natural processes, valuing the diversity of knowledge and cultural experiences;
6. Argue based on reliable facts, data and information, to formulate, negotiate and defend ideas and points of view that respect and promote human rights, access and participation of all without discrimination of any kind and socio-environmental awareness.

Personal and social skills:
7. Know, appreciate and take care of yourself, your body and well-being, and recognize and manage your emotions and behaviours, with self-criticism and the ability to deal with criticism from others and peer pressure;
8. Exercise empathy, dialogue, conflict resolution, cooperation and respect;
9. Respect yourself and promoting respect for others, welcoming and valuing the diversity of individuals and social groups without prejudice based on differences in origin, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, age, ability/need, religious faith or any other type;
10. Act individually and collectively with autonomy, responsibility, flexibility, resilience and determination, making decisions based on the ethical principles of democracy, inclusivity, sustainability, and solidarity.

Notes


3 José Mendonça Bezerra Filho, interview with case writers, 14 January 2022.


12 Ibid.


14 OECD, Education in Brazil.


17 Ibid.


20 Pierce, ‘Decentralization and Social Policy in Brazil’.


23 Pierce, ‘Decentralization and Social Policy in Brazil’.

24 Ibid.

25 Abrucio et al., ‘Regime de Colaboração no Ceará’.


27 Ibid.


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31 FUNDEB was officially replaced by a new programme in 2006: FUNDEB (the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and the Valorization of Education Professionals), which extended the programme to pre-primary and secondary education. Pierce, ‘Decentralization and Social Policy in Brazil’.


36 Ibid.


51 Ibid.


56 Ibid.; Power, Keynote at The Lemann Foundation Programme for the Public Sector launch.
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58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Denis Mizne, interview with case writers, 11 May 2021.
61 Tarlau and Moeller, ‘O Consenso Por Filantropia [The Consensus for Philanthropy]’, pp. 553-603.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Tarlau and Moeller, ‘O Consenso Por Filantropia [The Consensus for Philanthropy]’, pp. 553-603.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
73 Manuel Palácios, interview with case writers, 8 October 2021.
74 Tarlau and Moeller, ‘O Consenso Por Filantropia [The Consensus for Philanthropy]’, pp. 553-603.
75 Manuel Palácios, interview with case writers, 8 October 2021.
76 Tarlau and Moeller, ‘O Consenso Por Filantropia [The Consensus for Philanthropy]’, pp. 553-603.
77 Manuel Palácios, interview with case writers, 8 October 2021.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Tarlau and Moeller, ‘O Consenso Por Filantropia [The Consensus for Philanthropy]’, pp. 553-603.
81 Manuel Palácios, interview with case writers, 8 October 2021.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Tarlau and Moeller, ‘O Consenso Por Filantropia [The Consensus for Philanthropy]’, pp. 553-603.
85 Manuel Palácios, interview with case writers, 8 October 2021; Tarlau and Moeller, ‘O Consenso Por Filantropia [The Consensus for Philanthropy]’, pp. 553-603.
86 Tarlau and Moeller, ‘O Consenso Por Filantropia [The Consensus for Philanthropy]’, pp. 553-603.
88 Tarlau and Moeller, ‘O Consenso Por Filantropia [The Consensus for Philanthropy]’, pp. 553-603.
91 Petherick, ‘To Impeach or Not to Impeach Dilma Rousseff’.
92 Ibid.
95 Petherick, ‘To Impeach or Not to Impeach Dilma Rousseff’.
96 Ibid.
98 Petherick, ‘To Impeach or Not to Impeach Dilma Rousseff’.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Samuels and Zucco, Partisans, antipartisans, and nonpartisans.
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113 Denis Mzame, interview with case writers, 9 August 2021.


115 Ibid.


117 Manuel Palacios, interview with case writers, 8 October 2021.

118 Ibid.


120 Jose Mendoza Bezerra Filho, interview with case writers, 14 January 2022.

121 Maria Helena Guilmardes de Castro, interview with case writers, 19 October 2021.


124 Manuel Palacios, interview with case writers, 8 October 2021.

125 Cesar Callegari, interview with case writers, 14 September 2021.

126 Denis Mzame, interview with case writers, 9 August 2021.


128 Ibid.

129 Manuel Palacios, interview with case writers, 8 October 2021.

130 Ibid.

131 Maria Helena Guilmardes de Castro, interview with case writers, 19 October 2021.

132 Cesar Callegari, interview with case writers, 14 September 2021.

133 Paulo Blikstein, interview with case writers, 2 November 2021.

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